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Abstract 
Objective: In New South Wales (NSW), influenza surveillance is informed 
by a number of discrete data sources, including laboratories, emergency 
departments, death registrations and community surveillance programs. The 
purpose of this study was to evaluate the NSW influenza surveillance system 
using the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines for 
evaluating public health surveillance systems.
Importance of study: Having a strong influenza surveillance system is 
important for both seasonal and pandemic influenza preparedness. The 
findings will inform recommendations for strengthening surveillance in NSW.
Methods: The scope was limited to all sources included in the NSW Health 
Influenza Report in 2012–13. To assess the performance of the system, 
in-depth interviews (N = 21) were conducted with key stakeholders and 
thematically analysed. Respiratory testing data gathered through the 
sentinel laboratories in 2012 were used to estimate sensitivity, and laboratory 
notifications were analysed to assess timeliness and representativeness. Key 
documents – including reports, guidelines, correspondence and meeting 
minutes – were also reviewed, providing a method of triangulation. 
Results: The NSW influenza surveillance system integrates multiple 
sources of surveillance of influenza and influenza-like illness to provide a 
comprehensive picture of influenza in the community. Despite its structural 
complexity, the system delivers quality, timely and relevant data to inform a 
range of public health activities, and the NSW Health Influenza Report is well 
regarded by stakeholders. Challenges include managing system complexity, 
key person risk and cross-jurisdictional issues. Stakeholders commented 
that system flexibility would depend on additional resourcing. Although 
the sensitivity of sentinel laboratory surveillance was estimated as 1–25%, 
depending on the time of year, understanding sensitivity remains a challenge 
in influenza surveillance where the true incidence of infection is unknown.
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Key points 
• The New South Wales influenza 
surveillance system is informed by a 
number of discrete sources, which, when 
combined, provide a comprehensive 
picture of influenza that informs a range of 
public health activities
• The system, despite facing ongoing 
challenges in managing complexity and 
cross-jurisdictional issues, is able to 
deliver quality, timely and relevant data to 
stakeholders
• Increasing flexibility and stability, 
automating systems, and formalising 
processes for data acquisition would 
further strengthen the system
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Introduction 
Influenza is a highly contagious respiratory illness that 
is common in the winter months.1 Worldwide, around 
20% of children and 5% of adults develop symptomatic 
influenza A or B each year.2 Although most influenza 
infections are self-limiting, few other diseases extract 
such a high socioeconomic toll from absenteeism, 
medical consultations, hospital admissions and economic 
loss.3 Influenza viruses are unique in their ability to cause 
both recurrent annual epidemics and serious pandemics.4 
Surveillance is critical for monitoring virological changes 
and disease epidemiology, and informing public health 
responses.
According to the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) 
Global Epidemiological Surveillance Standards (2013), 
the overarching goal of influenza surveillance is to 
minimise the impact of influenza by providing useful 
information to enable planning of appropriate control 
and intervention measures, and effectively allocate 
resources.5 In New South Wales (NSW), the NSW Health 
‘Control guideline for public health units’ outlines the 
influenza surveillance objectives (Box 1).6 
Although confirmed influenza is a notifiable disease 
in NSW, it is assumed that only a small proportion of 
cases are laboratory tested.7 Surveillance for influenza 
thus uses a range of additional sources to monitor the 
onset, impact and duration of seasonal influenza, and 
forms the basis for pandemic surveillance. Over the 
past decade, data sources that have been used in 
surveillance include laboratory, general practice (GP) and 
emergency department data. Much of what is known as 
influenza surveillance is actually syndromic surveillance 
of influenza-like illness (ILI), which is considered a useful 
marker syndrome when multiple surveillance sources are 
triangulated and confounding factors are considered in 
interpretation of the data.8 
The aim of the present study was to evaluate the 
performance of the NSW influenza surveillance system. 
The scope was limited to surveillance sources included in 
the NSW Health Influenza Report.
Influenza surveillance in NSW
At the time of this study, several surveillance sources 
existed in NSW, but not all were included in the Influenza 
Report. The report is the key system output compiled 
by the respiratory epidemiologist in the Communicable 
Diseases Branch (CDB) of NSW Health, using the sources 
described in Box 2. It is available weekly during the 
influenza season and monthly at other times of the year.9 
The report is distributed to key stakeholders via email and 
the NSW Health website. 
Methods
In 2013, influenza surveillance in NSW was evaluated. As 
part of this evaluation, system performance was assessed 
in accordance with attributes set out in the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines 
for evaluating public health surveillance systems 
(Box 3).17 The CDC guidelines17 are well established and 
have commonly been applied to assess surveillance 
systems.18-20 
Conclusion: Influenza surveillance is critical for monitoring virological changes, 
understanding disease epidemiology and informing public health responses. 
The system was found to deliver timely and good-quality surveillance information. 
Additional value could be achieved by increasing flexibility and stability, 
automating systems (where possible) and formalising processes of data 
acquisition. The system continues to negotiate a number of constraints, including 
complexity and cross-jurisdictional issues, which are ongoing obstacles to 
realising some potential system improvements. 
Box 1	 NSW	Health	influenza	surveillance	
objectives6
• Determine and monitor the stage, size and 
geographical spread of the influenza epidemic in the 
community 
• Detect outbreaks in high-risk settings and implement 
appropriate control measures 
• Better understand the epidemiology of the disease 
• Determine the severity of the disease to inform 
appropriate disease control measures and health 
services planning 
• Determine the influenza strains circulating in the 
community to inform vaccine development 
• Determine resistance patterns of influenza circulating 
in the community to inform antiviral recommendations 
• Facilitate further studies, where necessary, to 
investigate epidemiology, clinical features and 
vaccine effectiveness
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Data collection to evaluate the surveillance 
system
To assess system performance, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with key stakeholders who were selected 
because they either played an integral role in collecting 
and providing surveillance information, or actively used 
the information gathered.21 Interviews followed a topic 
discussion guide, which covered the attributes of the 
surveillance system, its strengths and weaknesses, how 
surveillance information was being used, and areas 
where the system or its outputs could be improved. 
Interviews were recorded and reviewed repeatedly to 
enable detailed notes to be taken – this method has been 
documented as being cost-effective and theoretically 
sound.22 The data were analysed for emerging themes. 
System sensitivity was estimated by calculating the 
proportion of the total number of respiratory tests that 
were positive for influenza, using respiratory testing 
data provided by the sentinel laboratories in 2012. 
Laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications recorded in 
the Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
(NCIMS) were analysed to assess aspects of timeliness, 
data quality and representativeness. NCIMS notifications 
based on serology were excluded because they are not 
reliable indicators of current infection. 
A supplementary process of document review was 
undertaken to enable validation of information between 
sources.23 Documents included reports, guidelines, 
correspondence from key informants in the system, and 
minutes from surveillance meetings.
Ethics approval was granted by the University of New 
South Wales Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel G 
(approval number 9_12_042).
Results
A total of 21 interviews were conducted with a range of 
stakeholders from different agencies, comprising the 
NSW reference laboratories (n = 2), the World Health 
Organization Collaborating Centre (WHOCC) (n = 1), 
PHREDSS (emergency department surveillance; n = 1), 
Box 2	 The	NSW	influenza	surveillance	system	
Surveillance sources included in the NSW Health 
Influenza Report
Emergency department surveillance (PHREDSS).  
PHREDSS extracts data from 59 hospitals in NSW10, based 
on provisional diagnoses of influenza-like illness (ILI) 
coded according to ICD-9, ICD-10 or the Systematized 
Nomenclature of Medicine.11 Data include information on 
age, sex, triage category and admission status. Data feeds 
are uploaded in near real time or in 4-hourly batches, and 
are monitored at least daily. PHREDSS produces a weekly 
report used by the Communicable Diseases Branch (CDB) 
of NSW Health for surveillance, with opportunities available 
for enhanced surveillance, if required.
Mortality data. All death registrations entered on the 
previous day at the NSW Registry of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages are loaded into the NSW Health PHREDSS 
database weekly. Pneumonia and influenza causes of 
death are selected, and a seasonal time-series model is 
fitted, to forecast the average background mortality rate 
for the season. This is then used to compare how the 
observed pneumonia and ILI mortality rate differs from the 
expected rate, based on the trend.12 Data are transferred 
weekly to the CDB via email.
Laboratories. In 2012, 11 (nine public and two private) 
sentinel sites, including 2 reference laboratories, were 
responsible for specialised strain characterisation and 
typing. This represented 79% of all influenza notifications 
in 2012. Laboratories report weekly on the number of 
positive influenza results and respiratory tests undertaken. 
Data are submitted to the CDB via email, fax or an online 
database.
Most laboratories follow a scenario-based algorithm 
developed by NSW Health to guide referral of isolates to 
the NSW reference laboratories. The algorithm sets out the 
priorities for specimen referral in the interseasonal period 
and at different influenza activity stages during the season. 
The aim of the algorithm is to reduce the burden of referral 
at the height of the influenza season, when the workload on 
laboratories is heavy and the circulating strains are already 
well characterised.13
World Health Organization Collaborating Centre 
(WHOCC). The WHOCC performs an integral function 
for NSW surveillance, despite being based in Victoria. 
Specimens are referred for monitoring of antigenic drift 
and antiviral resistance, identification of novel strains, and 
development of the annual influenza vaccine. The WHOCC 
performs testing on an ad hoc basis unless prioritisation 
is requested, with results returned to the CDB towards 
the end of the season. In 2012, results were available for 
around 80% of specimens from NSW.
Public health units. Surveillance staff manually entered 
all laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications into the 
Notifiable Conditions Information Management System. 
Although notifications are not routinely included in the 
Influenza Report, the NSW Health website is updated daily 
with the numbers of laboratory-confirmed infections. Public 
health units are also responsible for monitoring influenza 
outbreaks in residential care facilities, which are included 
in the Influenza Report.
Other surveillance sources in NSW
A number of other community surveillance programs are 
in operation in NSW, but did not contribute to the Influenza 
Report at the time of this study. These include Flutracking, 
a weekly online community survey14; electronic general 
practitioner (GP) surveillance11 and ASPREN15 sentinel GP 
surveillance; and FluCAN sentinel hospital surveillance.16 
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a sample of staff (directors, surveillance officers and 
epidemiologists) from a selection of public health units 
in metropolitan and regional NSW (n = 10), the (then) 
Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 
(n = 1), the National Centre for Immunisation Research & 
Surveillance (n = 1), the NSW Ministry of Health (n = 4), 
and the chief executive of a local health district (n = 1). 
The results are presented according to the CDC system 
attributes.
Usefulness
The surveillance system was said to be meeting most 
of its stated objectives (Box 1). However, stakeholders 
disagreed regarding the extent to which the system 
captured disease severity. Some stakeholders felt that, 
although PHREDSS was able to provide an indication of 
disease severity by capturing critical care admissions, 
more comprehensive severity information would be 
useful. 
Stakeholders reported using surveillance information 
in a variety of ways, including in communication 
dispatches and media, planning and resource allocation, 
promoting vaccination among staff and patients, and 
epidemiological analysis. 
Participants regarded the NSW Health Influenza 
Report as timely, useful and able to inform a range of 
public health responses, although some suggested 
that data from other surveillance sources (Flutracking, 
FluCAN) should also be included. NSW was recognised 
by the Australian Government as a valuable contributor to 
national surveillance.
Simplicity 
Although the system was relatively inexpensive to 
operate, the need to integrate surveillance information 
from multiple data sources meant that the overall system 
was not considered simple. Individual data sources 
were identified by participants as having varying levels 
of complexity, with routine and automated systems 
considered the most simple. 
Some of the sentinel laboratory sites did not have 
automated systems, and required manual extraction 
and reporting of data. Although this was reported by 
laboratory staff to be “mostly easy”, the potential for the 
process to become time consuming, particularly during 
peak season, was acknowledged to be substantial.
Acceptability
The routine provision of data by both PHREDSS and 
the sentinel laboratories within the required 1-week 
reporting period was taken as a measure of acceptability. 
Stakeholders indicated, however, that acceptability was 
likely to be dependent on the capacity and workload 
of those interacting with the system. Sources that were 
routine and automated (such as PHREDSS) were seen as 
the most acceptable in terms of operation. Stakeholders 
commented that, when their workload increased, such as 
during peak influenza activity, ability and willingness to 
undertake enhanced surveillance tasks decreased. 
Stakeholder relationships played an important role in 
perceived acceptability. Participants reported that people 
and organisations were willing to participate in reporting 
where established relationships and processes were in 
place. For example, one stakeholder commented that 
gathering data from the sentinel laboratories was largely 
dependent on the availability of key informants to provide 
surveillance information. When key informants were not 
available to report data, reporting sometimes did not 
happen, and active follow-up was required.
Participants from laboratories commented on the role 
played by the scenario-based algorithm (which guides 
specimen referral at different stages of influenza activity)13 
in increasing acceptability. This algorithm was said to 
streamline and reduce reporting requirements, especially 
at times when workload was high.
Box 3	 Surveillance	system	attributes	defined	in	the	
CDC guidelines17
• Usefulness: refers to the ability of the surveillance 
system to contribute to prevention and control of 
adverse health-related events
• Simplicity: considers both system structure and 
ease of operation
• Acceptability: encompasses the willingness of 
people and organisations to participate in the 
surveillance system
• Sensitivity: refers to the proportion of cases of 
disease detected by the system. It can also refer to 
the system’s ability to detect outbreaks of disease 
and monitor changes in case numbers over time
• Positive predictive value: measures the proportion 
of reported cases under surveillance that actually 
have influenza
• Data quality: refers to the completeness and validity 
of data, and the processes of data acquisition
• Stability: refers to the reliability and availability of the 
system 
• Flexibility: refers to the ability of the system to adapt 
to changing needs or operating conditions with little 
additional time, personnel or funding
• Timeliness: is considered in terms of the availability 
of information to inform public health responses
• Representativeness: refers to the ability of the 
system to accurately describe the occurrence of a 
health-related event over time, and its distribution in 
the population by place and person
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Sensitivity
Stakeholders acknowledged that a large proportion 
of people with influenza do not undergo confirmatory 
testing, so obtaining reliable estimates of the incidence 
of influenza remains a challenge. Estimates of sensitivity 
can be made by monitoring the circulating influenza 
viruses, and by using a range of surveillance indicators. 
Assessing the diagnostic effort over time, by calculating 
the proportion of influenza-positive respiratory tests 
using testing denominator data provided by the sentinel 
laboratories, can also provide an indication of sensitivity. 
In 2012, the sensitivity of sentinel laboratory surveillance 
was estimated to vary from 1% in the interseasonal period 
to 25% at the height of the season (Figure 1). Sensitivity 
at the peak of the season corresponds to data from a 
seroprevalence survey conducted in NSW following the 
2009 pandemic, which calculated the population rate of 
pandemic H1N1 influenza infection to be 28%.24 However, 
it is known that a range of factors contribute to this result, 
including health-seeking behaviour, clinical testing 
practices and the prevalence of influenza. 
Stakeholders agreed that the virological data collected 
in the system were highly sensitive25 and stable over 
time. Further, informants in the laboratories noted that, 
under the new regulatory framework for in vitro diagnostic 
medical devices26, laboratories would be required to meet 
regulatory standards, which would increase the uniformity 
and quality of influenza tests. 
Positive predictive value
Stakeholders agreed that virological data collected by 
the sentinel laboratories came from molecular tests 
that were highly specific.25 Statewide notification data 
included a small proportion (11%) of case reports based 
on serological testing, which were known to have a lower 
specificity for acute infections. However, there was no 
indication that this had a significant negative impact on 
influenza surveillance reporting or generated superfluous 
public health activity, such as outbreak investigations.
Data quality
Stakeholders reported that data quality in the key 
surveillance systems (sentinel laboratories, PHREDSS 
and mortality data) was consistently monitored, and data 
anomalies were actively addressed to ensure that the 
required data were complete. Stakeholders stated that 
this could be resource intensive, particularly in systems 
where data were manually reported, such as the sentinel 
laboratories. 
The NCIMS was considered by stakeholders as 
having reasonable data quality for its purpose. However, 
because of issues with timeliness, it was not routinely 
relied upon, other than to capture notifications and derive 
the proportions of influenza A and B in circulation, which 
were reliably recorded for more than 99% of all confirmed 
infections. 
In the sentinel laboratories, the absence of clinical 
information accompanying referred specimens meant that 
determinations about representativeness and estimates 
of vaccine effectiveness could not be made. Most 
Figure 1	 Proportion	of	influenza-positive	respiratory	tests	by	month,	2012	
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stakeholders acknowledged that obtaining this clinical 
information was ideal; however, a number of practical 
constraints meant that this was unlikely to be achieved. 
Stability
Stakeholders reported that the overall system was 
stable, with consistent input from several sources, 
including the sentinel laboratories, PHREDSS and the 
WHOCC. PHREDSS was identified as a key strength in 
terms of regular and automated provision of information. 
Stakeholders raised questions about the system’s stability 
should demand increase significantly. Of concern were 
the data from the sentinel laboratories, particularly given 
that data acquisition relied on established relationships 
with informants.
Flexibility
Stakeholders reported that the surveillance system was 
robust and a sound platform from which to develop a 
pandemic response, although the degree of flexibility 
would be resource dependent. They suggested that 
consideration should be given to capacity of individual 
systems to manage increased demand. For example, 
enhanced surveillance was noted to be resource 
dependent, which was of concern for both the public 
health units and the laboratories. Participants commented 
that, if this situation continued, additional staffing would 
be necessary. Stakeholders within the laboratories 
indicated that managing the increased workload during 
winter was already a challenge, and that the system had 
struggled to meet demand during the 2009 pandemic.
Stakeholders noted that some data sources, such 
as PHREDSS, had been designed with flexibility in 
mind. PHREDSS had been successfully and promptly 
adapted to enable monitoring of critical care admissions 
in response to needs arising early in the 2009 pandemic 
(before establishment of pandemic intensive care unit 
surveillance through the Australian and New Zealand 
Intensive Care Research Centre).27 However, although 
PHREDSS could be responsive, participants commented 
that any changes would involve additional work. The 
laboratories and the WHOCC both reported flexibilities 
that would enable a timely response to interesting, 
unusual or important cases – this would involve reporting 
priority cases directly to laboratory staff. 
Timeliness
Timeliness varied across sources, but the overall system 
yielded timely information for its purpose. Reporting from 
the sentinel laboratories and the real-time monitoring 
offered by PHREDSS were both considered by 
participants as being timely, with both sources providing 
data at least weekly, as required. An examination of 
notification data in 2012 revealed that the average time 
between receiving a notification and entering it into the 
NCIMS was 1.7 days (range 0–141 days); the large range 
meant that the notification data were not considered to 
be reliably timely by stakeholders. Therefore, these data 
were not routinely included in the Influenza Report.
Stakeholders stated that assessments of timeliness 
varied, depending on the use and purpose of information. 
For example, reporting from the WHOCC on strain 
characterisations, antiviral resistance and vaccine 
matching was not considered timely for clinical purposes, 
but was timely for informing public health action. The 
WHOCC was also noted to be able to respond in a timely 
way when needed.
Representativeness
Participants commented that the representativeness of 
surveillance information was adequate for its purpose, 
despite its being only an indication of influenza infections 
in the community. 
Information from the sentinel laboratories was said 
to be reasonably representative. In 2012, the sentinel 
laboratories represented 79% of all influenza notifications 
in NSW. 
PHREDSS covered 59 hospitals in NSW – about 85% 
of all public hospital emergency departments – and 
participants considered this a reasonable geographic 
representation of the state. PHREDSS was also thought 
to give a good indication of influenza in the community, 
as presentations to NSW emergency departments for ILI 
include patients with mild infections as well as those with 
more severe illness. Some stakeholders commented that 
hospital representation in southern NSW was lacking, with 
only one PHREDSS hospital in that region. 
Discussion
The evaluation revealed the NSW influenza surveillance 
system as a complex network of discrete data sources. 
The overall system was found to perform well against the 
majority of the CDC surveillance system attributes and 
produced useful information that informed a number of 
public health activities. The key challenge for the system 
at the time of this study was in managing complexity. 
Although the diversity of surveillance sources was 
comprehensive, the integration of data to produce the 
Influenza Report was resource intensive, particularly 
where sources used manual data collection. The system 
was also observed to be heavily reliant on individuals 
who knew the system, its sources and informants well, 
and was thus subject to key person risk. For example, the 
process of collating data from the sentinel laboratories 
was dependent on established relationships with 
informants in the laboratories, and their availability and 
willingness to provide data. This was noted to be one 
of the more vulnerable aspects of the system, which 
would benefit from reinforcement to ensure stability of the 
system.
Another challenge was that some sources that provide 
critical input into the system operate in jurisdictions 
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outside the NSW Health system. Since this is unlikely to 
change, the management of cross-jurisdictional issues 
will remain an ongoing challenge. For example, such 
ideals as improving the timeliness and communication of 
information from the WHOCC in Victoria will be subject to 
prioritisation of WHOCC activities; NSW Health is only one 
of multiple WHOCC stakeholders.
Given that the true incidence of influenza in the 
population is unknown, understanding sensitivity remains 
an ongoing challenge. That said, the use of respiratory 
testing denominator data allows more accurate 
interpretation of trends, including whether changes in 
case numbers are due to disease activity or changes 
in health-seeking behaviours and subsequent testing 
practices. 
Stakeholders commented that system responsiveness 
would depend on additional resourcing. Strengthening 
the system to increase its flexibility would ensure that 
contingencies were in place to respond adequately to 
increased demand. Although Flutracking was not formally 
assessed, some stakeholders regarded it as a flexible 
system that would not depend heavily on additional 
resources. 
Efforts to automate data collection systems, such as 
the implementation of electronic laboratory reporting 
(enabling automatic uploading of laboratory notifications 
to the NCIMS), were already in the pipeline. These 
measures should help improve the stability, timeliness, 
quality and overall usefulness of data, as well as increase 
the acceptability associated with data provision and 
collation. Steps to formalise the processes around 
data acquisition would also be of benefit, reducing 
the susceptibility of the system to key person risk, and 
increasing the reliability and stability of the system. 
In response to findings from this study, the NSW 
Health Influenza Report now includes data from a wider 
range of surveillance sources. This includes FluCAN; 
however, given that only three NSW hospitals (Westmead 
Hospital, John Hunter Hospital and the Children’s 
Hospital at Westmead) are involved in FluCAN, more 
comprehensive severity information might improve the 
utility of surveillance information for some stakeholders. 
By the same token, expanding existing community-level 
sources (such as electronic GP surveillance) would 
improve surveillance of less severe disease, provide 
important epidemiological information on community 
infections and increase capacity for early detection.
This study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the 
scope of the study did not include a number of the 
related surveillance systems that provide information 
that is now included in the Influenza Report (Flutracking 
and FluCAN). Formal evaluations of these systems 
are currently under way. Secondly, although the 
evaluation sought to include a representative sample of 
stakeholders, the small sample size means that the full 
spectrum of opinions has not been captured. Finally, 
while the potentially subjective nature of qualitative 
methods is recognised, this risk was addressed through 
triangulation with document analysis, and comparisons 
across data and researchers.28 A consultative process 
around data interpretation was therefore undertaken to 
alleviate potential bias in the analysis.
Conclusion
This study identified a robust influenza surveillance 
system that performed well against the majority of CDC 
surveillance system attributes. The system was found to 
provide high-quality and timely data. However, a number 
of challenges were documented, including system 
complexity and cross-jurisdictional issues. Although the 
system would benefit from strengthening in some specific 
areas, the study highlights a number of constraints 
around the system as a whole, which are ongoing 
challenges to the realisation of some improvements.
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